Tuesday, July 22, 2008

Nuclear Deal - What it means for India and why the political parties are divided over it

The nuclear deal has created much debate inside and outside political circles for the past one year. Not many of us understand it well. Not that we were intended to too – by either the Congress (which is propagating it as being for the national good), or the Left Block (which is demanding the Congress Government’s head for it pursuing the deal), or the BJP (which can’t really decide which side to take; after all they started this, but they don’t want to lose out on the opportunity of toppling the Congress at the center). The general belief is that it is necessary for the country. But the general belief also is that it comes at a cost of compromising our position vis-à-vis the US, and hence we must not agree. Two sides of the same coin, you might say. No sir. These are not two sides of the same coin at all; the coin always has a third side – the circular edge – which due to its very nature of conjoining the two other sides, holds the real truth. And that is the truth that most political parties are not willing to let get revealed. But this article is not about my view of the political compulsions of various parties; this is about the merits and demerits of the deal itself.

So, what is the deal all about?

The nuclear deal is an agreement between India and the US, opening the gates for the US government to supply nuclear fuel and reactors to India, which will also enable the world to collaborate with India in civil nuclear usage, thereby helping our energy needs of the future, apart from various other gains. All the nuclear deal does is to grant a ‘waiver’ from the laws of the NPT, which India has vehemently refused to sign, so that American companies can now pursue nuclear trade with India. From an Indian perspective, the deal itself needs to be seen as what it is primarily – an agreement to shore up India’s energy security and gain access to nuclear and high technology, with transformative effects on foreign policy.

The Deal: Some basic compulsions

As per the agreement, the following must be adhered to for the deal to go through:
• Identifying and separating civil and nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner by India
• Filing a declaration regarding India’s civilian facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
• Taking a decision to voluntarily place India’s civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards
• Continuing India’s unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing

Arguments Against

• First and foremost, the proposed separation of nuclear facilities into civil and military is costly & difficult or rather impractical. It would also mean that we allow external agencies to come and examine our facilities, thereby exposing our capabilities to the world, and finally limiting them. The deal will impact India’s ability to produce requisite fissile material, as all new nuclear facilities will be civilian in nature and under the supervision of IAEA.
• Second, nuclear power is costly in nature and an emerging country like India can ill afford it. It is a luxury that only the developed world can enjoy and India should not count on it in its energy security calculus. In any case, the benefits are not going to be immediate, and hence there is no need to rush into signing this deal. We must look at other, more viable energy means in the meantime.
• Third, the deal is all about American promises and Indian commitments, and we just cannot trust US to keep its word. If it fails to do so, India will have traded in its independent nuclear program, without having received anything in the bargain.
• Finally, the deal does not remove the discriminatory nature of the present nuclear regime which India has been fighting all along. Why should India place all its existing and future civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision when other nuclear powers are not compelled to do so? In terms of statistics, out of the 915 facilities under IAEA safeguards worldwide, only 11 are in the 5 NPT nuclear power states.

Arguments For

• First, India is a fast growing economy that is looking for all the energy resources that it can get hold of, howsoever costly they may be. The denial of nuclear fuel due to provisions of the NPT regime has been precisely the reason behind the Indian nuclear establishment’s dismal performance. History has given us the chance and we must seize it. If international nuclear fuel is available, the cost of producing electricity will also come down and will be within the affordable range. The benefits that the future generations are going to reap are far too many to negate with a veto against the deal.
• Second, there is no provision in the deal that asks India to place its indigenously developed nuclear reactors under IAEA supervision. The deal is applicable only in the case of existing and future nuclear reactors that will be using international nuclear fuel. Technically, India can build up as many indigenous nuclear reactors as it wants for its security purposes.
• Third, to answer the proliferation charge, the present deal is a win-win situation for the non-proliferation regime since it brings India into the nuclear mainstream. India has consistently put its foot down to join the NPT regime, and has also not given any commitment to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). So, thus far, it has been denied the nuclear status (and benefits that follow) that it truly deserves. Nonetheless, India, despite being a declared nuclear power, has an impeccable non-proliferation record that needs to be trusted & rewarded rather than questioned & punished. That we have got the US to finally grant us what we deserve (and that too on our terms, without us signing the NPT or CTBT) is not just commendable, but laudable.
• Finally, India has still not signed the NPT treaty. But it will enjoy all the privileges available to declared nuclear powers under the NPT regime. In fact, in the eyes of the American non-proliferation lobby, the nuclear deal is an American sellout to India. They feel that the deal is likely to abet the nuclear weapon capabilities of India. For, by the very act of separating the civil & military facilities, without NPT being signed by India, the supply of international nuclear fuel will free its existing non-civil facilities, designated as military facilities, to produce plutonium and enriched plutonium exclusively for weapons’ purpose.

My Take

India is a developing economy and to maintain its current growth it needs power to run its industries. In a country like Germany, 60% of the power comes from nuclear power plants. To grow into a super power we need nuclear energy to keep the wheels of the industry, and thereby the economy, moving at a rapid pace. The deal’s biggest positive impact will be on the country’s energy needs, which becomes a critical consideration given the high oil prices touching $140 and more a barrel, and the imperative of maintaining high growth rates into the future. The second advantage is that it will gain India access to high technology – to larger capacity reactors, for instance, and to monitoring and safety technology. India’s nuclear establishment will be able to participate in international collaborative research on thermonuclear reactors, that could offer significant advantages in the future.

In the face of these advantages, some of the objections raised by critics seem quite peripheral and even trivial. There is, for instance, the criticism that technological cooperation will remain less than full unless the U.S. were to amend its laws to permit export of enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water technology. Or that arrangements for reprocessing the spent fuel imported from the U.S. have still to be negotiated, without which we do not know where we stand. The more substantive objections, however, are basically two.

The first is the Left’s view that the deal will take India into a closer strategic partnership with the U.S., which would mark a departure from the independent foreign policy line agreed to in the national common minimum program. It is a pretty well known fact that closer relations with the U.S. are essential for any progressive nation in a globalised world, because it controls the levers of economic and technological power. Nobody can really object to better relations as such but the Left, as always, is opposed to any relations with the U.S., whether they are beneficial or otherwise.

The second objection is from the BJP – that the deal will compromise India’s strategic autonomy and it will become virtually impossible to carry out another nuclear explosion. That, immediately after the Pokhran 2 blasts, the then Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee of BJP himself, and thereafter many leading scientists have already said that India has no further need for any more tests, is being conveniently forgotten by them, on the belief that public memory is short and nobody will remember what they said years ago. So, basically, the objection has nothing to do with the deal or its contents per se; it has more to do with the political needs of the BJP at present.

As I see it, the India-US nuclear deal is the much-needed fuel to regenerate our nuclear establishment that is stifling under present international regulations. If the status quo is allowed to prevail, our ambitious plan to be counted as a globally recognized nuclear power, and to derive benefits from the same, will only remain a pipedream. Of course, there are a few conditions, which may be strict in nature, that have to be adhered to. But despite all of those, it is clear that the advantages of the deal overwhelmingly outweigh any threat or flaw, and this is as good a deal as any government can negotiate for us. Were the country to miss this opportunity, it will be an uphill task for any future government to resurrect the deal with a new administration in Washington.

P.S. Almost the entire text of this message has been researched through various articles – both Indian and International. I cannot take any credit for the factual inputs into this; however, any analysis thereof and flaws in the same are solely mine, and I stand guilty should you find fault with my comments. I deliberately refrain from commenting on the political scenario which is likely to be revealed later today post the vote in the parliament. But I guess you can make out who I am backing – no, not the UPA, but the deal.

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